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Civil litigation typically ends when the parties compromise. While existing theories of 
settlement primarily focus on information exchange, we instead examine how motion 
practice, especially non-discovery motions, can substantially shape parties’ knowledge 
about their cases and thereby influence the timing of settlement. Using docket-level 
federal district court data, we find a number of strong effects regarding how motions can 
influence this process, including that the filing of a motion significantly speeds case 
settlement, that granted motions are more immediately critical to settlement timing than 
motions denied, and that plaintiff victories have a stronger effect than defendant victories. 
These results provide a uniquely detailed look at the mechanism of compromise via 
information exchange and motion practice in litigation while simultaneously yielding 









A generation of interdisciplinary legal scholars has worked to understand settlement’s 
propriety, timing, incidence, and causes.  This attention is not surprising given that most filed civil 
cases settle (Galanter, 2004; Eisenberg and Lanvers, 2009).  Indeed, settlement within formal 
litigation is but a part of an attenuated dispute resolution process which may entail several rounds of 
pre-complaint negotiation and continue well after the “case” has formally terminated (Clermont and 
Eisenberg, 2002).   Galanter (1985) minced no words when describing the landscape of disputes: 
“[T]he negotiated settlement of civil cases is not a marginal phenomenon; it is not an innovation; it 
is not some unusual alternative to litigation.  It is only a slight exaggeration to say that it is litigation” 
(1). 
Lawsuits begin with many known unknowns. A single filed complaint may advance multiple, 
often competing, theories and causes of action.  The plaintiff needs to have only a reasonable belief 
that her version of the facts is accurate, and along the way she will likely rely on discovery to know 
whether that faith is defensible.  Though individual defendants might be expected to know what 
they’ve done, entities will have to devote time to investigation before knowing what – if anything – 
actually happened. The court’s perspective on the relevant doctrine may at times be predictable, but 
its view of the facts will likely be shaped by factors both remote from the merits and exceedingly 
difficult to observe.  Even if the parties were not already adversely positioned, such informational 
gaps and barriers present formidable hurdles to the agreement of the parties and the settlement of 
their cases (Priest and Klein, 1984).   
What then can explain how cases progress toward settlement?  The empirical evidence has 
frustrated those hoping to find a conclusive answer to this question.  The settlement “rate” – the 
overall chance that a case in a given dataset will settle – varies by jurisdiction, case type, time, 
lawyering, judicial demographics and party characteristics (Eisenberg and Lanvers, 2009).  But this 
heterogeneity may obscure the role that information exchange through motion practice plays in 
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motivating settlement in individual disputes.  Indeed, one of just a handful of factors that distinguish 
formal litigation from dispute resolution outside of courts is that it provides the parties with a 
powerful tool – litigant-controlled motions – that enables them to force the exchange of 
information. In short, motion practice makes litigation dynamic and reflexive, permitting parties1 to 
learn about their cases (Kritzer, 1986).  
In the case of discovery, that learning process is direct.  It is therefore not surprising that 
much of the scholarship examining litigant learning and settlement, theoretical and empirical alike, 
has focused on the possible effect of discovery on case settlement (e.g., Shavell, 1989; Farber and 
White, 1991; Huang, 2007).  While discovery practice is the most salient way that this intra-litigation 
information exchange and learning takes place, the filing and resolution of other motions produces 
two additional sources of information: how the filing party understands the facts and law – their 
strategy for the case – and how committed they are to the case – the kind of resources they are 
willing to expend.  When the court is induced to rule, even when that ruling does not end the case, 
the parties gain a fourth source of information – what the court thinks about the legal merits and 
facts.  Because most accounts of settlement begin by assuming that it is uncertainty and/or 
asymmetric information about cases that prevents compromise (Bebchuk, 1984; Priest and Klein, 
1984), the process of litigation can be a way in which education toward compromise happens.  
In this study, we seek to further examine this progression of cases toward settlement by 
testing the effect of the filing and disposition of motions on the timing of settlement.  We begin in 
section 1 by developing a theory and five hypotheses for how information exchange through 
motions practice is likely to motivate case settlement in certain trial court cases. In particular, we 
expect that motion filing, content, and outcome, and movant identity may affect settlement timing in 
a case.  In section 2, we detail our data and methodology for carrying out our empirical tests.  As we 
describe there, this study utilizes an original dataset of 585 cases filed in federal district courts in 
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which plaintiffs sought to pierce the corporate veil, thereby holding a defendant business entity’s 
individual owners liable beyond the company itself.  To empirically analyze time to settlement in 
these cases (while accounting for both other, non-settlement termination methods and ongoing 
cases), we estimate a series of competing risks duration models (one for each motion-specific 
hypothesis) in section 3.  After doing so, we find, among other things, that the mere filing of a 
motion in a case hastens settlement.  In short, the time to settlement can be influenced by the 
dynamic characteristics of the litigation preceding it.  In sections 4 and 5, we discuss the significance 
of these results, including how they provide a controlled and uniquely detailed look at the 
mechanism of compromise via information exchange and litigation in the federal courts while also 
yielding evidence that this effect goes well beyond the traditionally studied discovery process.  
1. Theory & Hypotheses 
Early modeling of settlement, consisting largely of economics-based theoretical accounts, 
focused on how the interaction of the parties’ subjective probabilities of victory, divergent 
expectations, error-prone calculations of their likelihood of success, and asymmetrical information, 
along with the cases’ stakes and costs of litigation affect settlement rates (Posner, 1973; Priest and 
Klein, 1984; Bebchuk, 1984).  This research generally predicted that the farther apart the opposing 
litigants were in terms of these metrics, the less likely they should be to settle. 
Over time, research has ventured to test these theoretical models quantitatively.  This work 
has found that factors such as, for example, the parties’ experience and status (Waldfogel, 1998), 
case importance or severity (Landes, 1971; Elder, 1989), and repeat attorney interaction (Johnston 
and Waldfogel, 2002) can all play a systematic role in predicting the likelihood of case settlement.  
One notable line of this empirical research focuses on the specific effect of discovery in reducing 
informational uncertainties and asymmetries and thereby promoting case settlement. As Farber and 
 6 
 
White (1991) put it, “[t]he two-way exchange of information during the discovery process 
encourages resolution of cases without trial by making the information available to both sides more 
alike and by increasing the likelihood that both parties have the same expectation about the trial 
outcome” (201). Quantitative work, including studies of medical malpractice cases in U.S. litigation 
(Farber and White, 1991) and general Taiwanese civil lawsuits (Huang, 2007), provides strong 
support for this discovery-settlement effect. 
Scholars have also considered, though to a much lesser degree, the duration of litigation and 
timing of case settlement.  They find, for example, that institutionalized legal rules, such as those 
involving fee-shifting and fee structures (Fournier and Zuehlke, 1996; Helland and Tabarrok, 2003), 
comparative negligence rules (Kessler, 1996), and liability standards (Chang and Sigman, 2000) can 
influence the time to case termination and settlement.      
Due largely to data limitations, only a small handful of settlement-timing empirical pieces 
have begun to make a connection between information exchange and the timing of case settlement.  
Spurr (1997) finds, for example, that cases settle more quickly when they have been referred to a 
settlement specialist during the litigation.  Johnston and Waldfogel (2002) discover an effect on 
settlement timing due to the repeat interaction of attorneys and their corresponding ability to reach 
swifter litigation compromises.  Similarly, Fenn and Rickman (1999) find strong effects on 
settlement timing based on parties’ costs and liability calculations, as well as on the presence of legal 
aid.  Kotkin (2007) finds that settlement amount increases after the filing of a motion.  These articles 
certainly advance our understanding of this process but are also, understandably, limited by 
litigation-specific variables that are measured at one point in time (usually case filing or settlement). 
Following in the footsteps of this work on settlement timing, we seek now to gain a better 
theoretical understanding of the micro-level dynamics of litigation and how this affects when in the 
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life of a dispute settlement is likely to happen.  Settlement, as we have discussed, can occur at any 
moment after injury and takes different forms.  It need not entail a transfer of wealth from the 
offending party to the disputant, and, famously, is almost always privately concluded without judicial 
intervention or sanction.2  Indeed, most disputes are resolved via formal or informal compromise 
prior to the filing of a complaint, as the injured party either bears its losses or the injurer makes a 
pre-filing payment (Aubert, 1967; Miller and Sarat, 1980-81; Trubek et al., 1983).   
When the parties fail to settle during the early stages of dispute resolution, injured parties can 
initiate formal proceedings.3  There are, we suggest, two general kinds of cases that meet this 
threshold.  The first are ones in which the parties, through shared experiences or pre-filing 
communication, share an understanding of the facts and the putative plaintiff's damages. However, 
they have disagreed as to whether the plaintiff has the resources, or motivation, to escalate the 
dispute and pursue litigation.  To borrow a poker parlance, the defendant believes that the plaintiff 
is bluffing in his threat to involve the courts.  The complaint is a response, turning up the Aces in 
the plaintiff's hand (Clermont et al., 2010). Such cases are likely to end quite early in the life of a 
lawsuit, ordinarily without resorting to the formal litigation process (Rosenberg and Shavell, 1985; 
Nielsen et al., 2010). 
In other cases, there has been relatively little interaction between the parties, or at least they 
have not had the number and quality of discussions necessary to close the informational gaps 
between them.  Because of this, the parties remain divided at case filing by their views of the facts or 
the legal merits.  As has been classically described, such cases are marked by asymmetrically held 
information (Farber and White, 1991).  For compromise or settlement to become a reality, 
information exchange is crucial.  While remaining mindful of the existence of the former group of 
filed cases (the “early settler, no litigation activity” lawsuits), we focus here primarily on this latter 
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group of cases, an emphasis that allows us to more closely examine the relationship between 
information exchange and the timing of settlement once formal litigation commences.  
To do this, we turn first to behavioral psychology, which provides an explanation for why 
cases in this latter group do not and should not settle at an even rate over time. Korobkin and 
Guthrie (1994), Rachlinski (1996), Guthrie (2000), and Korobkin (2002) have argued that 
individuals’ settlement decisions are influenced by their reference points.  The simple version of the 
theory is that plaintiffs view the choice between settlement and non-settlement as between two 
gains, one certain and one contingent.  Defendants, who can only lose money in litigation, see two 
losses, with settlement being certain and trial merely possible.  Given that choice, says prospect 
theory, plaintiffs should be risk averse and prefer settlement (the sure over the uncertain gain) while 
defendants should be risk seeking and prefer trial, even if the parties agree on what the relevant 
probabilities are (Rachlinski, 1996). 
As later work has explored, this reference setting can be complicated: if the plaintiff sees the 
litigation through the lens of how it looked before any injury, “gains” in settlement may actually feel 
like losses, and thus these uncompensated plaintiffs will prefer rolling the dice (Korobkin and 
Guthrie, 1994). What is clear is that these reference points may change during the life of a lawsuit.  
Plaintiffs may adapt to the losses they have suffered (Bronsteen et al., 2008). Or the defendant, who 
we have assumed views the lawsuit as all loss, may see a preliminary ruling from a judge validating its 
position in part as a psychological victory: settlement preserves the gain (or at least avoids the loss).  
Thus, as the litigation develops, the parties’ basic orientation – “I’m currently ahead, the future is a 
choice between types of losses” or “I’m currently behind, the future can only be better” – can shift, 
and the shifts may be dramatic.  These reference point changes will influence the settlement rate.4   
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Also relevant here is a distinct theory that relies on rational litigants but also incorporates 
insights from the valuation of options.  Real options theory posits that the parties update their 
expectations about the variance of outcomes that might result from litigation, based on information 
coming from the court and from the other parties (Grundfest and Huang, 2006). As variance 
increases, the “option” to remain in the lawsuit becomes significantly more valuable; as it decreases, 
so does the value of the option and therefore the amount that the party would demand in 
settlement.   
Notably, both psychological and real options theory depend on the parties updating their 
views of the case as it develops.   This learning process relies crucially on the actions of the parties in 
filing motions.  Consider the parties’ settlement posture before the filing of a motion to dismiss.  
They have asymmetric information about the facts, but are symmetrically unclear on how the court 
will respond to the uncertain legal theories, particularly if they have not litigated the issue before 
their assigned judge or magistrate in previous litigation. If the defendant does not make a motion, 
the playing field for settlement will be unchanged (or very close to unchanged) after the filing of the 
complaint.5  Factors present at filing will dominate settlement’s incidence and timing. 
If the parties do engage in motion practice, the informational content of the case changes – 
even before the other party has a chance to respond and the court to rule.  As we have suggested, 
motion practice provides at least four distinct kinds of information to the parties.6   
The first – and most intuitive and commonly studied – is factual.  A motion to compel, if 
granted, forces the disgorgement of documents or testimony from one party, updating the other 
party and reducing information asymmetries.  Similarly, the documents appended to motions, even if 
previously disclosed, can highlight for a party the facts which search costs might have otherwise 
obscured (Huang, 2007).  Of course, almost all factual discovery occurs without motion practice, as 
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the parties exchange documents, take depositions, and answer interrogatories without any court 
intervention.  Indeed, motions to compel probably indicate that the ordinary mechanisms of 
information exchange have broken down.  Factual discovery, with or without court intervention, is the 
form of information exchange that most empirical scholars to date have focused on, and it is a very 
important driver of settlement. 
But discovery is not the only way that formal litigation can inspire compromise.  A second 
kind of information is strategic.  The filing of a motion to dismiss, for instance, tells the plaintiff 
about the defendant’s perspective on the case, including, for example, the cases that he will rely on 
throughout the litigation and his theory of non-liability.  The responsive brief similarly informs the 
defendant about the plaintiff’s view of the law.  Because various theories have distinct probabilities 
of relief – and require the parties to expend different amounts of resources – this opportunity for 
strategic learning is precious.  
The third source of information is the kind of resources the parties wish to spend on the case.  
Learning about resource allocation is indirect and turns in part on the degree of polish on the 
papers.  Did the party spend money to be sure that the brief was carefully cite- and fact-checked, the 
tabs pointing to the appropriate exhibits, the writing especially clear, and the arguments freshly 
generated?  Lawyers probably know, looking at a brief, whether the other side is going all out to win 
the particular motion, or has made a filing in the usual course. This resourcing decision, in turn, can 
update the parties’ views of how much the case is worth, the likelihood of protracted litigation, and 
the other side’s reservation value in bargaining.  Indeed, the mere filing of a motion may force a 
party to expend resources in response that it would rather have conserved.  Motion practice thus 
may signal a party's commitment to the litigation. 
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Fourth, motion practice may produce information about the judge.  When the court rules, 
assuming that it passes on dismissing the action entirely, the parties learn a tremendous amount 
about how the court sees the case. Does the court see a nuisance suit, scorned and humbled, but 
sent through to discovery?  Will the judge be closely involved with the merits, pruning claims away?  
Which issues are set up for resolution at summary judgment, and what standards does the court 
provide about the scope of discovery? (Kritzer, 1986) 
These four kinds of informational exchange imply that different kinds of motions, made by 
various parties, resolved or left pending by the judge, at distinct times, will have different kinds of 
influence on the amount of total information available.  This leads us to our hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1:  The filing of a motion will increase settlement speed 
As we have explained, the mere filing of a motion should bring the parties to the bargaining 
table, by motivating learning and the updating of the parties’ subjective beliefs.7  Filing a motion 
implicates each of the first three sources of information exchange – strategy, resources, and facts.  Thus, 
regardless of the disposition of the motion (granted or denied, in whole or part, or pending), we 
expect to see an uptick in the rate of settlement following its filing.   
Hypothesis 2:  Granted motions will increase the settlement speed rate more than denied motions 
Substantive motions that do not end the case – e.g., a plaintiff’s motion to certify a class or a 
defendant’s motion for partial dismissal or partial summary judgment – can be granted or denied.  
When granted, we would expect that the court will provide more information to the parties than if 
the court denied the motion, if only because the decision to say “no” may mean “not yet.”  There is 
also evidence that denied motions to dismiss are almost never explained in written opinions 
(Hoffman et al., 2007).  Thus, the amount of information conveyed by a judge in a granted motion 
will often exceed the amount of information conveyed by a judge in a denied motion. 
 12 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Plaintiff interstitial victories will prompt faster settlement than defendant victories 
At judgment, defendants generally win more cases than plaintiffs do – a function of multiple 
factors, including selection, disparities in resources, the burden of proof, and anti-plaintiff bias 
(Siegelman and Donohue, 1995). For example, Parker (2006) found that racially based employment 
discrimination cases settled after plaintiff motion-level victories more often than after defendant 
motion-level victories, while Kaplan et al. (2008) found that plaintiffs recovered more in settlement 
than they did at trial and that workers whose claims were exaggerated tended to settle less often.  
This suggests that when plaintiffs do win at the interstitial stage (i.e., a victory that does not end the 
case) such wins will be more informative - in the sense of revealing the real strength of the plaintiff's 
case - than when the defendants win such intermediate motions.  In our dataset, consisting of veil 
piercing cases, we have an additional reason to expect this result: plaintiff interstitial victories will 
make it more likely that individual defendants' personal assets will be exposed to a liability judgment.  
Given that defendants' prior expectations in such cases is that their personal assets will be protected 
by the entity's veil, any plaintiff success will be likely to provide an important and highly salient new 
piece of information about the case's settlement value.   
Hypothesis 4: Motions that turn on the application of law to fact will be more likely to influence settlement than those 
that are resolved on the pleadings 
The informational content of dispositions is likely to increase over time, as the factual 
picture develops and the judge pays more attention to the case.8  In part, this is a function of 
incentives: judges have a limited amount of time to spend on a given case and rationally will choose 
to do so in the factual position best developed for review and which is most likely to face an 
appellate challenge.  Therefore, as compared to motions resolved on the pleadings (such as motions 
to dismiss, arbitrate, remand, or strike), motions that turn on application of law to fact (e.g., 
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summary judgment, class certification, evidentiary rulings, and patent construction) will likely 
contain more information because the court has devoted more resources to their production.  Being 
more informative, such resolutions will decisively influence the settlement process (Rave, 2006). 
Hypothesis 5:  Motions seeking clarification of particularly uncertain law will be more likely to influence settlement 
timing than motions seeking clarification of certain law 
Since our theory depends on the positive influence of learning, we expect that motions 
targeting legal issues that are generally thought to be difficult or obscure will have a greater influence 
on settlement than motions targeting doctrines the parties know better.  Our dataset examines veil 
piercing cases, an area of law famously decried as “rare, severe, and unprincipled” (Easterbrook and 
Fischel, 1985) and an “unprincipled hodgepodge of seemingly ad hoc and unpredictable results” 
(Millon, 2007).  In our data, we can distinguish between motions that ask judges to resolve an issue 
related to piercing the veil – such as veil piercing specific discovery, or a motion to dismiss targeted 
at the veil piercing allegation – from motions that are not so specifically focused.  We expect that 
veil specific motions, because they potentially resolve a particularly uncertain doctrine, will have a 
more significant influence on the settlement rate than ordinary litigation practice.  
We contend that these five motion-related hypotheses are causal in nature, since they meet 
the standard articulated by Holland (1986): “[t]he key notion . . . is the potential (regardless of whether 
it can be achieved in practice or not) for exposing each unit to the action of a cause” (946). 
Although concerns regarding correlation and reverse causation are inescapable in observational data 
studies like ours (Winship and Morgan, 1999), we are inclined to discount that objection for our 
central hypotheses.9  With Hypotheses 1, for example, we expect that the filing of a substantive 
motion in a case, and the resulting information that it puts into circulation among the case actors, 
can cause the moment of settlement in the case to move up.  The reverse of this, that imminent 
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settlement causes motion practice and information exchange, is untenable since, as our cases without 
any motions or litigation activity reveal (discussed in further detail below), engaging in post-filing 
motion practice is not the most efficient way to settle cases when the parties have already 
approached a fully informed compromise position.10  
 We are less certain about the causal story for one particular kind of motion – those 
concerning discovery.  Discovery motions can either seek to prevent disclosure (a motion for a 
protective order) or, more commonly, prompt it (a motion to compel).  Thus, some granted 
discovery motions will enable crucial information exchange – for example, an order that denies a 
privilege claim and requires the disclosure of a particularly damaging document.  But, more typically, 
discovery motions signal that the parties are failing to exchange information as they would in the 
ordinary case.  This raises a problem not of causation but of selection.11  Thus, it is very hard to 
know what inferences to draw from the filing or the grant of a discovery motion.12   It is for this 
reason that we separately control for these motions.   
2. Data & Methods 
 To test our hypotheses, we examined federal trial court litigation, from case filing through 
settlement.  We collected cases in which plaintiffs sought to pierce the corporate veil: the database 
contains 697 separate district court cases filed from 2000 to 2005, a 78% random sample of all 
eligible and available federal veil piercing cases within this period. To meet our criteria of “eligible 
and available” and be included in our sampling population, a case’s complaint had to be present in 
Westlaw’s Trial Pleadings Database, 13 filed in a federal district court,14 and include at least one veil 
piercing claim.15 We exclude from this sample 112 cases that terminate via default judgment, 
bankruptcy, remand, and transfer or that contain lengthy, non-terminal stays.16 Of the remaining 585 
cases, we focus primarily on the 452 that terminate via settlement.17  
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 For coding events, parties, and activity in each case, we utilized the pleadings, the docket, 
and any other relevant case documents electronically attached to the docket.18  After gathering the 
primary pleading from Westlaw, we turned to PACER (“Public Access to Court Electronic 
Resources”) to retrieve the case docket and other case documents.  
This dataset of veil piercing lawsuits consists largely of commercial disputes between at least 
three represented parties.  In most such suits, the plaintiff advances a contract or commercial tort 
claim against a defendant corporation and its owners, seeking to impose liability both against the 
company (which may or may not be judgment proof) and the individuals.  The veil piercing claim 
thus operates as a derivative and remedial measure, much like a punitive damages allegation, rather 
than as a substantively significant cause of action.  
While our data were identified based on the inclusion of a veil piercing claim, two different 
metrics indicate that our underlying cases represent a broad array of lawsuits. First, and not 
surprisingly, the complaints serving as the origin for our data contain a wide variety of causes of 
action, including tort, contract, RICO, ERISA, and common law fraud claims. In addition, the cases 
in our data span a number of Nature of Suit (NOS) codes. At the time of filing, the filing party 
identifies a single NOS code for the case, which serves as a snapshot of what the filer believes best 
summarizes the case.   Within empirical legal research, scholars frequently use these codes to identify 
case issue areas (e.g., Siegelman and Waldfogel, 1999; Johnston and Waldfogel, 2002; Galanter, 
2004).  Figure 1 depicts the NOS code distribution for all cases filed in federal district courts (black 
bars; measured in 2007) and the distribution of codes within our dataset (gray bars).  While our data 
are certainly not representative of all filed cases (as measured by NOS code distribution), we can see 
that nearly all major NOS categories are present, with the one real notable exception being prisoner 
petition lawsuits.  Not surprisingly, the overall NOS distribution of our data is highly suggestive of a 
set of commercial litigation cases.  Despite this variability in NOS codes and causes of action, 
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however, we remain cognizant of the fact that our data are limited in their scope and generalizability, 
a topic that we return to further in the discussion section below.    
To operationalize our hypotheses, we required information on the timing of cases as well as 
on the motions, the parties, the judges, and other case characteristics.  Our dependent variable of 
interest throughout this study, time to settlement, is measured as the number of months that a case is 
pending (“survives”) from its date of filing through the date of settlement. Summary statistics on 
case survival time as well as on our other variables are reported in Table 1.  As the table indicates, 
cases in our data survive between 1 and 58 months, with a mean survival time of nearly 17 months. 
<COMP: Place Figure 1 about here>> 
<COMP: Place Table 1 about here>> 
To empirically analyze time to settlement, we use a series of duration models.  Our model of 
choice, the competing risks regression model (Fine and Gray, 1999), allows us to estimate the effect 
that individual case variables have on the time to case settlement.  The model accounts for 
alternative (competing) termination modalities besides settlement, like trials and dispositive motions. 
Because the effect of case characteristics on settlement may depend on the existence of these other 
possible methods of case termination, failure to account for these non-settlement terminations may 
bias our results (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004).  Competing risk models resolve this concern 
and, for this reason, have been used in other litigation-related duration work as well (Eisenberg and 
Farber, 1997).19  
A competing risks model also allows us to account for censored data.  Due to inherent 
limitations from studying relatively recent filings, some cases in our dataset had not terminated by 
the time we finished collecting data.   The competing risks model is well designed to treat these type 
of censored data and avoid the bias inherent in dropping these cases altogether from the study.   
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Within our data, the 29 cases not terminated by August 18, 2008 are included but, because they have 
not yet “failed” (but still hold the potential to do so going forward), are censored.  
Our key independent variables revolve around the motion activity in our cases. Our 
measurement of each motion is discrete and time varying in nature.  We capture these motions 
through two mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive dichotomous variables: (1) one for the 
first month after the motion is filed (or resolved, depending on the motion) and (2) one for the set 
of all months thereafter (i.e., the second through the nth month) until the case ultimately terminates. 
This measurement strategy allows us to more precisely capture the potential propelling effect (often 
referred to as the hazard ratio) that motions may (or may not) have on cases as they move toward 
settlement. 
Because of this research design and the time-varying nature of these variables, our dataset is 
constructed in an expanded format, where each month of each case has its own observation.  As a 
result, while we have 585 cases, our dataset contains 9,931 case-month observations.20   
Motion made measures the presence of substantive (non-discovery) motions in a case, 
regardless of how and whether those motions are resolved.  Motion granted and motion denied measure 
the type of outcome for resolved, substantive motions in a case.  Plaintiff motion granted and defendant 
motion granted quantify the presence of granted substantive motions where either a plaintiff or a 
defendant was the moving party. Application of law to fact motion denied and pleading-based motion denied 
measure the existence of denied motions in these two categories, where motions of the former type 
include summary judgment, class certification, discovery, evidentiary rulings and patent construction 
and motions in the latter group include motions to dismiss, arbitrate, remand, or strike.21  Finally, veil 
piercing motion made and non-veil piercing motion made capture the presence of substantive motions that 
either do or do not center primarily on the veil piercing claim(s) in the case.  As we note above, we 
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also separately control for discovery motion made.  Each of these variables is coded as 1 when the 
motion and/or outcome of interest is present and 0 otherwise. Any time more than one such type of 
motion and/or outcome happens in a case, we record the first occurring instance. 
In addition to our motion-level variables, we also control for a number of other variables 
concerning case actors, type, and strength that may affect the timing of case settlement or other 
termination.  
Galanter (1974) sparked a large body of theoretical and empirical research examining the 
effects that litigant status and differences in resources due to that status have on the litigation 
process. The common argument (and empirical support) goes that imbalances in the resources and 
power of opposing litigants will leave the weak in a position of disadvantage and will lead to 
disproportionate outcomes for the stronger party (e.g., Kritzer and Silbey, 2003; Collins, 2004; 
Schwab and Heise, 2011; Black and Boyd, 2012). To measure this, we look for cases where the 
plaintiff is an individual and the defendant is an entity, contrasting such uneven matchups to cases 
where both plaintiff and defendant are entities.22 Therefore, entity v. entity measures cases where both 
the plaintiff(s) and the defendant(s) in the lawsuit are entities.  Any time an individual party is 
involved on either side of this dispute (as evidenced through the case docket and pleadings), this 
variable is coded as 0.   
To control for the possibility that Eisenberg and Lanvers (2009) observation that “strong 
cases tend to settle; weak ones do not” is also connected to the momentum of settlement, we 
include a variable for case strength in our models.  Case strength is coded from a case’s complaint and 
takes on a value of 1 when plaintiffs argue that undercapitalization is a primary ground for piercing 
the corporate veil in the case.  Previous work found this factor to be a strong indicator of overall 
case strength (Boyd and Hoffman, 2010). 
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We also account for the effect that repeat play among attorneys (or the lack thereof) might 
have on the pace of a case.  Attorneys familiar with one another will be more likely to seek to 
maximize shared gains and less likely to posture and exaggerate their positions, meaning that such 
repeat players will make settlement more likely (Johnston and Waldfogel, 2002).  The same effect 
may be present for the timing of settlement.  We operationalize the repeat play effect by asking if the 
case includes local counsel.  Local counsel appear in cases where the controlling lawyers are not 
admitted to the bar in the filing jurisdiction, and their role, including performing tasks like certifying 
papers, is rather ministerial in nature.   Local counsel in the case is thus a proxy for the main 
attorneys being strangers to one another and, where present, may well delay case settlement. Local 
counsel participation is measured based on the presence of a local counsel listed among the case’s 
attorneys or through the presence of a pro hac vice motion, as recorded on the case docket and/or 
pleadings.  
Many scholars have argued that females communicate and behave differently from males 
(Gilligan, 1982), and that this translates to more empathetic and problem solving based judicial 
behavior (Brudney et al., 1999; Martin et al., 2002).  If female judges do indeed behave consistently 
with the gendered theories, when it comes to litigation and case management they may actively 
encourage cases to settle, both more frequently and more quickly than their male peers.  To control 
for this possibility, we include female judge in our models, a variable that is coded as 1 when the 
district judge of record is a female.   
On the theory that chief district court judges are aware of administrative constraints and are 
more likely than their district colleagues to worry about case load reduction pressures (Hettinger et 
al., 2006), cases assigned to district court judges with experience as a chief judge (chief judge) may 
settle more quickly than other cases. Any time a case has more than one assigned district judge over 
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its life, we code this based on the judge at the time of case filing.  We retrieved the information on 
these judges from the Federal Judicial Center’s Biographical Directory of Federal Judges. 
We also control for a variety of case characteristics.  These include whether the case was 
removed from state court (removal), what type of nature of suit category the case was classified into 
(see Figure 1 for categories), the type of jurisdiction asserted in the complaint (diversity jurisdiction or 
federal question jurisdiction), whether there was a jury demand by any party, and whether the case had any 
signs of litigation activity (a dichotomous, non-time varying variable indicating the presence of any 
substantive or discovery motion in a case).23 
3. Results 
Figure 2 provides descriptive details on the distribution of settlement times in our data.  The 
top panel’s dotted line depicts settlement times in our data from case filing to case settlement for 
cases without any recorded litigation activity – such as substantive and discovery motions.  For these 
cases, the data are positively skewed, with settlement commonly occurring in the very early stages of 
the case.  This is analogous to the recent findings in Nielsen et al. (2010) regarding early settlement 
in some cases. It is also consistent with our expectations regarding early settling, motion-free cases 
where the filing of a lawsuit serves as the final bargaining tactic for a plaintiff in already well-
developed pre-filing negotiations between the two parties.  
The solid black line in the top panel of Figure 2 displays just the opposite, showing the 
distribution of settlement timing for cases with litigation activity.  In these cases, settlement timing 
varies greatly, with a relatively even distribution over time.  It is in these cases that we expect motion 
practice to help foster information exchange and thereby motivate faster settlement.  The bottom 
panel of Figure 2 depicts, again descriptively, the time to settlement from the filing of the first 
substantive motion to the settlement.  This figure’s pattern closely resembles non-litigation settlement 
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timing. In other words, the graphical display in the bottom of Figure 2 provides preliminary, 
descriptive evidence that in cases with litigation activity, the filing of motions propels cases toward 
settlement in a way does not otherwise happen prior to motion filing.  
<COMP: Place Figure 2 about here>> 
To provide a more concrete statistical test of this settlement timing effect and how it plays out for 
our hypotheses, we estimate a series of competing risks regression models. The model, implemented 
in STATA 11, yields subhazard ratios.  It takes the following form for each observation (case 
month) in our data  
! 
hj(t | X) = h j , 0(t)exp(X")      (1) 
where j represents competing termination methods in our data (0=censored, 1=settled, 2=other), X 
indicates the covariates in each of our models (time-varying and fixed), and !!represents the effects 
of these covariates.    Because of the nature of our time-varying data, our estimates include robust 
standard errors (Huber, 1967; White, 1980) and are clustered at the case level to correct for a lack of 
independence among these observations.24  Model (1) includes the motions-related variable 
necessary for testing Hypothesis 1 (motion made). Model (2) tests Hypothesis 2 with motion granted and 
motion denied.  Models (3) and (4) test Hypotheses 3 and 4 with plaintiff motion granted and defendant 
motion granted and pleading-based motion denied and application of law to fact motion denied, respectively.  
Finally, veil piercing motion made and non-veil piercing motion made in Model (5) allow us to test Hypothesis 
5.  For each of our five models, the chi-squared statistic reaches statistical significance at the p<0.05 
level and indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that our covariates, together, have no effect. 
For ease of substantive interpretation, we report the results in these models in Tables 2 and 
3 as subhazard ratios, a statistic that is simply the exponential of the estimated coefficient.  These 
subhazard ratios allow us to quantify the underlying increase (or decrease) in the likelihood of a case 
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terminating by settlement in a fixed time after filing due to the added presence of these different 
types of motions. In terms of interpretation, a subhazard ratio over 1 indicates that a covariate has a 
positive effect on the risk of case settlement while a ratio below 1 indicates a negative effect.  
<COMP: Place Table 2 about here>> 
<COMP: Place Table 3 about here>> 
The statistical significance and signs for the key results reported in the tables for these five 
models provide us initial evidence for each of our five hypotheses.  As we can see, many of our 
motion variables have substantial statistical and substantive effects when it comes to the timing of 
case settlement.  For example, as indicated in Table 2, Model (1), being in the 2nd+ month  
following the filing of a substantive motion increases the odds of settlement by 375% compared to 
the chance in that same case prior to the motion being filed. Interestingly, while the odds of a similar 
increase in settlement speed are also positive in the first month immediately following the motion 
filing, they do not reach statistical significance at the p<0.10 level.  
To better describe the substantive effect of motions being filed (2nd+ month), we plot the 
Cumulative Incidence Function (CIF) curve of our Model (1) competing risks regression in Figure 3.  
The CIF provides the probability of the failure of interest while accounting for the presence of other 
competing failures (Coviello and Boggess, 2004; Kim, 2007).  Because of the time-varying nature of 
our key independent variable in Model (1) (motion filing), we are able to estimate the CIF before and 
after a motion is filed (while holding constant all other model variables).  We plot the resulting CIF 
curves from these two estimates in Figure 3.  As we can see there, prior to a motion being filed 
(black line), the probability of settlement (our “failure” of interest) remains below 0.10 even as a case 
enters its second year.  However, once a motion is filed (gray line), we see an immediate uptick in 
the slope of the curve and the likelihood of case settlement. This, consistent with Hypothesis 1, is 
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evidence of the propelling effect that we expect the filing of motions to have on case settlement 
timing. 
<COMP: Place Figure 3 about here>> 
Now, turning to tests of Hypotheses 2 through 5, we examine this motion effect in a more 
fine-grained way.  Recall that in Hypothesis 2 we expect that motions granted will have a stronger 
effect on settlement timing than those that are denied.  As Model (2) in Table 2 reveals, granted 
motions have an immediate effect (in the first 30 days after motion disposition), leading to an 
increase in the speed of settlement of 270%.  A similar immediate effect is not present for denied 
motions.  However, both granted and denied motions do have substantively important effects on 
settlement timing after that first month. Denied motions have a slightly larger effect compared to 
granted motions in this context (a 68% increase in settlement odds compared to 54%), but a Wald 
test reveals that this difference is not significant.25   
For Hypothesis 3, we can see in Model (3), Table 2 that, as expected, the plaintiff’s granted 
motions have a stronger effect on settlement timing than those from the defendant.  Indeed, in the 
first month after a plaintiff’s substantive motion is granted, settlement speed is increased by over 
450% (subhazard ratio of 5.538); after the first month of that successful plaintiff motion, the risk of 
case settlement increases by a more modest (but still significant) 54%. While positive, neither of the 
variables for defendant granted motions reach statistically significant levels.  
In the context of Hypothesis 4’s results (found in Table 3’s Model (4)), neither motions 
applying law to fact nor pleading-based motions have a statistically significant effect on settlement 
timing in the first month after they are denied.  After that first month, each type of motion has a 
positive effect on settlement timing (subhazard ratios of 1.5 and 1.25, respectively), effects that are 
not, statistically speaking, different from one another.26   
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Finally, for Hypothesis 5, neither veil piecing motions nor non-veil piercing motions have, 
statistically speaking, an immediate effect on case settlement (Table 3, Model (5)). After the first 30 
days, however, both types of motions increase the subhazard rate of settlement, with non-veil 
piercing motions (a 126% increase in the rate) surprisingly doing so with more heft than those of a 
veil piercing nature (a 42% increase).27  
Overall, then, we have strong support for two of our five motions-related hypotheses (1 and 
3), modest support for Hypothesis 2, and no support for Hypotheses 4 or 5.   
Turning briefly to our control variables, we find that some, but not all, have a statistically 
significant effect on the time to case settlement. As we observe in Models (1)-(5), discovery motions 
rarely have a statistically significant effect on the rate of case settlement and, when they do, that 
effect is quite modest compared to the effect of substantive motions (e.g., a 29% increase in 
settlement rate in Model (1)). This result, when paired with our theory and findings on substantive 
motions, provides an important caveat for previous research linking settlement timing to discovery 
practice (e.g., Farber and White, 1991; Huang, 2007).  
We also find evidence that the sex of a case’s judge has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on settlement timing. In our five models, a female judge’s presence leads to anywhere between 
a 40% and 49% increase in settlement rate.  While this sizable, consistent, and positive result is not 
likely to be surprising to those across fields of study that argue that women leaders and managers are 
more effective at fostering an environment of compromise and negotiation than men (Eagly and 
Johnson, 1990; Rosenthal, 1998), it does stand in sharp and impressive contrast to the notable 
published empirical work in the settlement arena that finds no difference in settlement rates among 
cases assigned to male and female judges (Ashenfelter, Eisenberg, and Schwab, 1995).  We hope that 
future work will explore this effect, and the theory behind it, in much greater detail.  
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We also find, as expected and confirmed in our descriptive results above, that cases without 
any litigation activity settle much more quickly than those with it (in each of our five models).28 We 
graphically depict this effect in Figure 4 by once again plotting the estimated CIF curve for cases 
without any substantive or discovery motions.  For sake of simplicity, we estimate this solely for 
litigation activity in Model (1).  The resulting sharp, rapid uptick in the probability of settlement 
depicted in Figure 4 is quite impressive.  And, more importantly, when the litigation activity figure is 
viewed alongside Figure 3 above, it goes a long way toward confirming our expectation that cases 
with and without litigation activity are qualitatively different from one another, particularly when it 
comes to information exchange and settlement timing.29  While not filing any motions may be the 
fastest route to case settlement, most cases, in our sample and in trial courts more generally, lack the 
necessary litigation information to be positioned for this.   
<COMP: Place Figure 4 about here>> 
We also find that a jury demand is associated with as much as an 18% decrease in the rate of 
settlement in a given month in three of our five models, something that may reflect litigation 
uncertainty upon filing. Finally, negative, but statistically insignificant, results characterize our local 
counsel, case strength, litigant status (entity v. entity), and chief judge control variables.  These (non) 
results may well indicate that these control variables are not settlement and/or termination-timing 
specific.   They are not our main focus here, of course, but their performance certainly should prove 
intriguing for future work tackling the intricacies of the litigation process and its relation to 
settlement. 




This study has allowed us to unpack the relationship between post-filing settlements, the 
dominant termination method for cases in trial courts today, and the litigation process.  Our results 
confirm that a key mechanism of formalized litigation – motion practice – can and does influence 
settlement and the timing of when it occurs. Our federal district court data enable us to get a unique 
picture of the details of litigation and to systematically study the dynamic nature of the whole 
process, something that had previously been focused almost exclusively on discovery.  Similarly, our 
methodology, including competing risks regression models of duration and time-varying motion-
level covariates, allows us to capture the propelling effect that motions made and ruled on can have 
on the timing of case settlement. 
In summary, our empirical modeling reveals that, as predicted, the filing of a substantive, 
non-discovery motion speeds case settlement.  In addition, we also find support for our expectations 
that motions that are granted are more immediately important to the settlement rate than motions 
denied and that plaintiff victories have a more substantial effect than defendant victories.  These 
findings are substantial in both the direction of their effects and in their size.   
Our work further illustrates the importance of continued study of the settlement process. 
Theoretical and empirical work on settlement is quite extensive, covering both domestic and foreign 
tribunals. Canvassing the literature, we find that researchers’ interest in the subject is largely driven 
by two goals.  First, scholars seek to learn what factors motivate settlement, which is assumed 
(generally) to be a social good that ought to be subsidized.  Investigations in this mode have 
generally assumed that the parties are passive and that changes in fixed case attributes are the levers 
which might be pulled in a more efficient manner.  Our work demonstrates that motion practice can 
influence the timing of settlement, through unlocking information that the parties and the court 
otherwise would not share with one another. While our study provides an important insight on this 
subject, we expect that future projects will employ larger, more globally representative, datasets that 
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more closely mirror the NOS distributions depicted in black bars in Figure 1 and that deal with a 
more diverse set of issues.  These future studies could further illustrate the interaction of motion 
type, timing, and settlement. As time passes and electronic case resources become more 
comprehensive and cheaper to study, this kind of work will be increasingly easy to perform. 
Second, scholars seek to learn about settlement because they really wish to know about the 
effect of various changes in the legal regime on case outcomes – who is winning and who is losing.  
Here, our work on the timing of settlement fits in a recent tradition that notes that early settlements 
may result in important distributional consequences for the parties (e.g., Nielsen et al., 2010).  Data 
on the timing of settlement has the advantage of being relatively easy to collect, unlike information 
on how the parties have divided the pie. Our finding that parties can motivate settlement through 
their own efforts might help to focus research on new ways of looking at “victory.”  For instance, a 
settlement that results from party A making and winning a motion might be more likely to be felt 
(by A and B) to be A’s “victory” than a settlement that happens absent motion practice.  
The analysis of settlement’s timing could also be used to examine the influence of lawyering: 
sophisticated lawyers might be extracting more value from litigation (in terms of efficient 
compromise) than less sophisticated lawyers, through tactically-timed motion practice.  Scholars of 
settlement to date have largely discounted these active roles for lawyers and lawyering, preferring to 
see both clients and lawyers as passive obstacles to settlement.  Employing this framing of the 
“problem” of settlement, policymakers have focused on changing the law, or helping judges to learn 
techniques, to encourage compromise.  But our research suggests that the parties have an important 
role to play, and that the structure of the procedural rules in particular might influence the timing of 




While we believe this work makes substantial strides in providing systematic evidence into how the 
dynamics of litigation like motion practice can affect settlement, we would be remiss to not mention 
a few of its limitations.  Most importantly, apart from the causation concerns discussed above, the 
dataset is limited to veil piercing cases, and as such is not representative of all federal cases, let alone 
all litigation. We see in our dataset proportionately fewer torts, civil rights, and constitutional claims 
than the typical federal filing, and proportionately more contract, labor and intellectual property 
suits.  It is possible that litigation of these commercial disputes is not generalizable to other kinds of 
cases, which, in state court in particular, ordinarily resolve a personal injury claim.  Settlement in 
personal injury cases may be even more strongly driven by attorney agency costs, as large 
"settlement mills" control many filings (Engstrom, 2009). This would tend to result in stronger 
effects for attorney characteristics, including some that are unobservable on the face of the docket. 
Similarly, our dataset is limited in time and scope, with cases filed from 2000 through 2005 and 
which had their initial complaints available on Westlaw's PLEADINGS database.  While we have no 
reason to expect that the latter limitation creates bias, it might be that the introduction of electronic 
docketing – when coupled with other products of the digital revolution—has worked a fundamental 
change on settlement practice.  Certainly, e-discovery has increased the costs of civil litigation, 
making settlement an ever-more-attractive alternative to continued litigation.  Thus, as compared to 
cases filed before digital docketing, our sample might overemphasize the importance of motion 
practice in settlement, as settlement is more common today than it used to be (Clermont and 
Schwab, 2004; Galanter, 2004).30   
At the same time, we observe neither the amount of settlements, nor the demands of the 
parties.  Previous work found these two factors very important in determining the likelihood and 
nature of any eventual compromise (Kaplan et al., 2008; Schwab and Heise, 2011). 
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We do not discount these limitations.  However, even after considering them, we believe 
that our approach advances this area of research by empirically examining the effect of litigation 
motion practice, including substantive, non-discovery motions, on the intra-case timing of 
settlement.  Only through the recent advent of new technologies and an increase in systematic 
electronic record-keeping across the federal trial courts have the data utilized for this kind of 
dynamic study of litigation become available.  As additional technologies, measurements, and 
methods continue to emerge, we suspect that future work will be well positioned to continue to 
refine this approach and address some of the concerns about our work that we state above.   
5. Conclusion 
Cases settle because the parties choose to compromise rather than contest.  Until recently, 
the content of these settlements was a black box that impeded our understanding of the civil justice 
system.  It has become clear that “future scholarship on the American civil justice system will 
inevitably have to include rigorous work on settlement and settlement behaviors” (Schwab and 
Heise, 2011, 934).   Through the use of a unique hand-collected dataset of federal trial court cases, 
this project helps to illuminate the mechanism of settlement by focusing on the parties’ use of the 
litigation process, and particularly motions, to obtain information from one another and the court. 
Our most substantial and important finding is that motion practice can spur settlement even in the 
absence of a judicial ruling.  This in turn suggests that the parties may use the processes of litigation 
to exchange information with one another, meaning that procedural rules which discourage motion 
practice may also slow settlement.  The findings thus reveal a more nuanced, dynamic and reflexive 
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1 In this paper, we generally use the word “parties” to mean the global unit comprised by the client 
and lawyer.  We do insert attorney-specific controls in our models.  But, generally, we do not explore 
how the motion-based learning process we propose is influenced by the peculiarities of the attorney-
client relationship.  This area is ripe for further empirical research.   
2 A notable exception (outside of the class context) is a consent decree, a settlement document 
negotiated by the parties but entered and (potentially) enforced by a judge (Kim et al., 2009).  
3 We ignore for the purposes of simplicity those cases that are begun in arbitration or another form 
of "alternative" dispute resolution forum.   
4 Some suggest that lawyers may reduce the magnitude of irrational party decisions that prevent 
settlement (Gilson and Mnookin, 1994; Nielsen et al., 2010).  Selection makes this a difficult and 




5 The example is stylized because in many cases, automatic disclosures under Rule 26 can result in 
discovery before the filing of any motions. 
6 The role of motion practice in the emotional landscape of settlement is complex.  A lawyer may file 
a motion so that a client feels that their story has been told – aggressively – and thereby permit 
settlement where otherwise the client would have wished to continue to fight.  But the filing of such 
aggressive motions might at the same time spark negative emotions in their targets, and thereby 
depress the likelihood of compromise. Regardless of the particular emotional valence of a motion, 
the control enabled by motion practice generally increases litigant happiness with dispute resolution 
(Lind and Tyler, 1988).   
7 Suggestively, a recent large scale study of federal civil litigation found that “40% of cases with 
[mooted motions to dismiss] settle[d] or were voluntary dismissed” (Institute, 2009, 49). 
8 Bronsteen (2007) argues that parties routinely delay settlement until after summary judgment, with 
defendants in particular hoping for “an opportunity to win without the risk of losing.”   Bronsteen’s 
argument rests on a number of assumptions, and crucially models only three moments to resolve 
cases: early (before motion practice), after summary judgment, and at trial.  As a reviewer 
alternatively suggests, there is a possible drag on the timing effect.  In some cases, the progression of 
time (and related case activity) will have excavated most of the important information, so that when 
the case proceeds to dispositive motions post-discovery, settlement timing will not receive nearly as 
much of a boost from the motion practice. In such cases, earlier motions will be more surprising – 
and thus more informative.  To the extent that this information-saturation hypothesis is correct, it 
would tend to dampen observed effects.  
9 Certain judge demographic characteristics are unlikely to raise these concerns, as judge assignment 
at the district court level occurs after filing and approximates randomness.  However, attributes, like 




10 We must also consider the possibility of omitted variable bias – i.e., the presence of a third 
variable that is causing both the filing of a motion and, shortly thereafter, a settlement (Clarke, 
2005).  Within our analyses, we are unable to imagine such a systematically omitted and biasing 
variable.  A far-fetched possibility would be for the defendant's insurance carrier to make paying off 
a settlement contingent on a particular litigation strategy – for example, the filing of a motion to 
dismiss. Obviously, this is not common practice. 
11 We thank an anonymous reviewer for noting this important difference. 
12 Why is it that the same selection story isn't confounding for nondiscovery motions?  In one sense, 
it is: cases in which motions are filed are qualitatively different from cases without litigation activity 
– the parties did not cooperate sufficiently prior to filing to make a fast, motion-free settlement 
possible.  But for cases in which motions are present, if substantive motions were to be associated 
with cases that are more difficult to settle, we'd expect and observe negative, not positive effects for 
motion activity. 
13 Westlaw’s Trial Pleadings Database has coverage beginning in 2000 and includes “selected 
pleadings, complaints, and answers filed in state and federal courts.”  Westlaw, Pleadings database 
content, 
http://web2.westlaw.com/scope/default.aspx?db=PLEADING&RP=/scope/default.wl&RS=WL
W10.03&VR=2.0&SV=Split&FN=_top&MT=Westlaw&MST= (last visited October 5, 2010).  
While we readily admit that our reliance on Westlaw’s Trial Pleadings Database to identify a 
sampling population limits our ability to speak to or sample from the true underlying population of 
veil piercing related complaints filed in federal courts, we do have reason to believe that the 
Westlaw-drawn data do allow us to get as close as is practical given lingering complaint-level data 




[C]onversations with Westlaw research representatives indicate that for veil piercing cases, 
this database covers or nearly covers the universe of federal claims.  In particular, although 
not for specific attribution, a Westlaw representative with supervisory responsibilities over 
the PLEADINGS database said that it was designed to collect all federal complaints since 
2000 that lawyers litigating commercial cases would have a plausible interest in learning 
about.  Thus, PLEADINGS may exclude civil rights cases, or habeas petitions, or family 
disputes, but attempts to collect every tort, contract, or federal statutory claim brought 
against corporate defendants.  With respect to State complaints, which may or may not be 
electronically filed, West currently collects material from larger urban centers, and 
consequently does not have comprehensive records from smaller jurisdictions (Boyd and 
Hoffman, 2010).  
14 There are 18 federal district courts with no cases represented in our final data, including: Central 
District of Illinois, District of Alaska, District of Guam, District of Idaho, District of Hawaii, 
District of Montana, District of New Mexico, District of North Dakota, District of Northern 
Mariana Islands, District of Puerto Rico, District of Rhode Island, District of the Virgin Islands, 
Eastern District of Oklahoma, Middle District of Tennessee, Western District of Arkansas, Western 
District of Kentucky, Western District of Tennessee, and Western District of Texas.  
15 In the Westlaw pleadings database, we ran the following search: (“alter ego liability” or pier! /s 
corpor! /s veil or “unity of interest” or (corpor! /s (facade or shell or sham or undercapitalized 
conduit)) and da(aft  01/01/2000) and da(bef 01/01/2006)) to identify these veil piercing related 
cases. 
Our search yielded just under 900 unique and usable federal district court veil-piercing cases.  
Prior to commencing our collection of data for these cases, we randomly ordered them, after which 




cease coding and turn to analysis when our research resources and time necessitated it, something 
that for us came after fully coding 697 cases – i.e., 78% of the Westlaw Pleadings Database’s 
population. 
16  We exclude cases that result in a default judgment for three reasons.  First, in such cases typically 
the defendant has not shown up at all, and there is no possibility for information exchange or 
settlement in the formal litigation process.  Second, such cases typically proceed without any non-
default judgment-related motions.  Finally, from talking with practitioners, we also learned that many 
of the veil piercing default judgments in our dataset were filed by labor unions against small painting 
contractors, whose personal bank accounts were to be attached after the default (for failing to 
contribute to pension plans) issued.  We concluded that including these cases made little sense in a 
general study of litigation.  
We exclude cases terminated via bankruptcy, remand, and transfer, since, while they did 
“terminate” in a district court, they did not do so with any finality, making their inclusion in our 
competing risks modeling as either “ongoing and censored” or “terminated but not settled” as 
troubling.  Finally, for those cases with lengthy, non-terminal stays (10+ months), our timing-
focused modeling is unable to account for the stoppage in case activity, which in our cases was 
nearly always occurring so that bankruptcy proceedings could commence elsewhere.   While we 
believe that the exclusion of all of these cases is empirically and theoretically justified, their inclusion 
would not alter the primary conclusions yielded from our regression analyses.  
17 As we note below, while we are concerned with settled cases in this study, our modeling strategy 
accounts for settled and non-settled cases to prevent any bias that might occur from focusing solely 




18 Our data collection from these documents focuses on case and party information that is critical to 
understanding the evolution of piercing and non-piercing claims and the outcome of those claims in 
a case.  
19 An alternative modeling technique would be to focus exclusively on the settled cases in our data.  
Setting aside the dependency and selection bias concerns noted above, this is a technique used by 
others in the field studying the “pace of litigation” and how it applies specifically to settlement 
timing (Spurr, 1997; Fenn and Rickman, 1999).  While we believe that the competing risks approach 
better accounts for the overall methodological concerns of our data, modeling our data in this 
traditional way (settled cases only) using a Cox Regression Model changes very little regarding the 
significance of our key covariates. Full results of these alternative models are available upon request.   
20 Our modeling strategy accounts for the dependencies that are present in our expanded data by 
clustering the robust standard errors on individual cases. 
21 We compare two "denied" motions here (as compared to Hypothesis 2, which contrasts granted 
and denied motions).  We do so because granted motions may terminate the case entirely, leaving no 
possibility for settlement. In Hypothesis 3, we are interested in comparing the propelling effect 
toward settlement of different kinds of motions.   
22 Unlike Hadfield (2005), who found that individuals suing organizational defendants are less likely 
to settle than organizations suing organizations, we focus only the timing to settlement in cases. 
Given the nature of our dataset, there are almost no cases in which an individual is the sole 
defendant. 
23 As we describe in further detail below, our models also include an interaction of litigation activity 





24 In supplemental models not reported in the text but available upon request, we also estimated 
shared frailty models to account for possible within-circuit correlations in settlement environments.  
Equivalent to random effects in the non-survival analysis setting, this modeling technique effectively 
groups the data by circuit and results in estimated hazards that are conditional on this frailty (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004).  These models do not reveal any statistically significant within-
circuit correlations.  While it might also be fruitful to model the frailty at the district level, because of 
the size of our dataset and since some of our districts contain so few cases, attempted shared frailty 
models at the district level fail to converge.   
25 Chi-squared 0.18, p=0.67 
26 Chi-squared 0.58, p=0.45 
27  A Wald test of these differences reveals that we can reject the null hypothesis that the effect of 
later-term non-veil piercing motions on settlement timing is equal to the effect of later-term veil 
piercing motions. Chi-squared 7.79, p<0.05.  
28 A key assumption of the competing risks model is that of proportional subhazards or, in other 
words, that the effect of modeled covariates, within individual observations, are consistent across 
time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). We find evidence that our litigation activity variable is 
nonproportional.  To correct for this, we follow the advice of Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2001) 
and Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) and the example of Meinke (2005) and Brooks (2005) and 
include an additional term in our models (the interaction of litigation activity with the log of our 
time variable) that then allows us to proceed and assess the direct effects in our modeling.  The 
appropriate interpretation of our large, positive, and statistically significant interactive term is that 
the negative effect of litigation activity sharply grows over time in a case.   In other words, this 




much lower (and increasingly so) than it is for cases without any litigation activity at all. This can be 
informally visually observed by contrasting Figure 3's CIF curves with the CIF curve in Figure 4.  
We also note that alternative modeling excluding this interaction (not reported in the text) yields 
essentially the same results that we have presented in the manuscript (but does not afford us the 
confidence of having corrected for nonproportionality).    
29 In supplementary analyses not reported here, we estimated our five models after excluding cases 
without litigation activity altogether. While the size of the effects for our hypotheses’ variables 
change slightly, none of the overall results are altered. The results from these analyses are available 
from the authors upon request. 
30 That said, it is not obvious why this bias would have any effect on the relationship of motions and 
the timing of settlement. 
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Motion made 59% 
Motion granted 13% 
Motion denied 34% 
Plaintiff motion granted 6% 
Defendant motion granted 8% 
Application of law to fact motion 
denied 14% 
Pleading-based motion denied 20% 
Veil piercing motion made 33% 
Non-veil piercing motion made 33% 
Discovery motion 18% 
Entity v. entity  10% 
Case strength (undercapitalization) 24% 
Local counsel participation 29% 
Female judge 23% 
Chief judge 24% 
Jury demand 62% 
Litigation activity present 63% 
Removed from state court 11% 
Diversity jurisdiction 45% 
Issue areas See Figure 1 
  
Settled 77% 
Involuntarily dismissed 8% 
Summary judgment or  
judgment as a matter of law 7% 
Trial verdict 3% 
Censored  
(ongoing on August 18, 2008) 5% 
  
Months of survival (mean) 17 months 
Survival time range 1-58 months 
  
Table 1: Summary statistics of key variables in database. Percentages 
listed are computed from the 585 cases in our database used in our 
























Motion made (1st month) 1.973 (1.06)     
Motion made (2nd+ mth) 4.748** (1.11)     
Motion granted (1st month)   3.704** (1.42)   
Motion granted (2nd+ mth)   1.540** (0.27)   
Motion denied (1st month)   0.778 (0.35)   
Motion denied (2nd+ mth)   1.682** (0.23)   
Plaintiff mot. granted  
(1st month)     5.538** (2.77) 
Plaintiff mot. granted  
(2nd+ mth)     1.542* (0.35) 
Defendant mot. granted  
(1st month)     1.286 (0.91) 
Defendant mot. granted 
(2nd+ month)     1.216 (0.24) 
Discovery motion (1st month) 0.456 (0.45) 0.353 (0.35) 0.356 (0.35) 
Discovery motion (2nd+ mth) 1.294* (0.19) 1.175 (0.17) 1.158 (0.17) 
Entity v. Entity 0.847 (0.13) 0.844 (0.14) 0.849 (0.13) 
Case Strength 0.949 (0.11) 0.954 (0.11) 0.966 (0.11) 
Local Counsel Participation 0.909 (0.09) 0.877 (0.09) 0.89 (0.09) 
Female Judge 1.395** (0.15) 1.427** (0.16) 1.440** (0.15) 
Chief District Judge 0.961 (0.10) 0.926 (0.10) 0.944 (0.10) 
Jury Demand  0.842* (0.08) 0.838* (0.09) 0.849 (0.09) 
Litigation Activity 0.007** (0.00) 0.018** (0.01) 0.015** (0.01) 
ln(time) x Litigation Activity 3.106** (0.61) 3.244** (0.61) 3.761** (0.70) 
Issue Area Controls Included  Included  Included  
Jurisdiction &  
Removal Controls Included  Included  Included  
Log Likelihood -2483.11  -2500.173  -2506.625  
Chi-Squared 243.59**  217.46**  203.93**  
Observations 9931  9931  9931  
Cases 585  585  585  
Failures via Settlement 452  452  452  
Competing Failures 104  104  104  
Censored 29  29  29  
Table 2: Competing Risks Regression Results for Models (1)-(3). ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Baseline variables are contract cases, those 
where an individual is involved in the litigation as either a defendant or a plaintiff, and federal question jurisdiction.  Standard 























Applic. of law to fact motion denied   
(1st month) 0.734 (0.45)   
Applic. of law to fact motion denied 
(2nd+ month) 1.506** (0.31)   
Pleading-based mot. denied (1st month) 0.734 (0.52)   
Pleading-based mot. denied  
(2nd+ month) 1.249* (0.16)   
Veil piercing motion (1st month)   0.878 (0.51) 
Veil piercing motion (2nd+ month)   1.420** (0.19) 
Non-veil piercing mot. (1st month)   0.487 (0.49) 
Non-veil piercing mot. (2nd+ month)   2.255** (0.31) 
Discovery motion (1st month) 0.339 (0.34) 0.42 (0.42) 
Discovery motion (2nd+ month) 1.144 (0.17) 1.321* (0.20) 
Entity v. Entity 0.836 (0.13) 0.817 (0.13) 
Case Strength 0.968 (0.11) 0.983 (0.11) 
Local Counsel Participation 0.888 (0.09) 0.906 (0.09) 
Female Judge 1.398** (0.15) 1.487** (0.16) 
Chief District Judge 0.921 (0.10) 0.949 (0.10) 
Jury Demand  0.858 (0.09) 0.821** (0.08) 
Litigation Activity 0.018** (0.01) 0.013** (0.01) 
ln(time) x Litigation Activity 3.511** (0.66) 3.314** (0.65) 
Issue Area Controls Included  Included  
Jurisdiction & Removal Controls Included  Included  
Log Likelihood -2510.156  -2495.99  
Chi-Squared 178.81**  223.02**  
Observations 9931  9931  
Cases 585  585  
Failures via Settlement 452  452  
Competing Failures 104  104  
Censored 29  29  
Table 3: Competing Risks Regression Results for Models (4)-(5). ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Baseline variables are contract cases, 
those where an individual is involved in the litigation as either a defendant or a plaintiff, and federal question jurisdiction. 









Figure 1: The distribution of Nature of Suit (NOS) codes, by broad category, in our data and for all cases filed in federal 
district courts in 2007. Data on 2007 filing distributions accumulated from Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, March 31, 2007. Data on NOS categorization derived from Administrative 








Figure 2: Proportion of all settling cases in our data that terminate in a given month of a case. The top panel depicts these 








Figure 3: Cumulative Incidence Function curves for the changing values of the motion filed (2+ month) variable in Model 



















Figure 4: Cumulative Incidence Function curve for Model (1) when litigation activity is set to 0. Other variables in the 
model are held at their mean and modal values. 
 
